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Abstract: Strict Liability and the Liberal Justice Theory of Torts
Professor Alan Calnan
Ask a group of tort scholars to explain the relationship between fault and strict
liability and the responses are likely to be sharply split. An economist might reply that
strict liability—assigned on the basis of efficiency—should be the rule and fault, if it is to
apply at all, but a reluctant and occasional exception. A moralist, however, would likely
give the opposite opinion—that fault, defined as deontological culpability, should be the
rule and strict liability the exception.
Ironically, both economists and moralists often base their views on liberal
principles. Economists rely on the political dimension of liberalism, arguing that
government generally should not intervene in free market transactions, but if it must, it
should do so only with clear tort rules that minimize accident costs. Not surprisingly,
moralists rely on the moral dimension of liberalism, contending that tort law should
promote private rights and freedoms by creating and enforcing personal responsibilities.
Both views, however, share the same three flaws. Methodologically, they are onedimensional in outlook (focusing on either the moral or the political, but not both) and
unilateral in objective (seeking to either punish or deter injurers while virtually ignoring
the injured). Substantively, they are strangely illiberal (promoting either social welfare or
some particular conception of the Good).
In this article, I offer a liberal justice tort theory that avoids these pitfalls. It is
holistic, encompassing both sides of tort law’s dual personality; relational, invoking
justice concepts that illuminate the bilateral aspects of all torts; and classic, adopting a
longstanding and mainstream perspective that seeks only to protect and promote
individual liberty. After recapturing and redefining strict liability, I demonstrate how that
ancient concept can lay the groundwork for a new metatheory of torts.
My thesis, in short, is that strict liability is both a moral-political and a
substantive-procedural concept that must be implemented in a two-step process. The first
step determines whether the parties’ encounter and its effects were consensual. If consent
exists, the consenter is held strictly liable for her own loss, irrespective of the fault of her
counterpart. If no consent is found, or if it is not an issue, liberal justice theory then
implements a scheme of reasonableness, grounded in concepts of strict law and equity, to
determine the actor’s liability. Strict law creates substantive rules that forbid, inhibit or
sanction certain people, activities or relations that pose the greatest and surest threats to
freedom and equality. However, even when a person, activity or relationship is not
covered by a strict substantive rule, equity may episodically impose strict procedural
requirements on actors who hold an unfair advantage in the trial of their actions. Because
litigation itself is a threat to the freedom of the loser, the ad hoc adjustment of procedural
burdens serves to correct an important imbalance between the parties and restores them to
a state of moral and political equality.
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Strict Liability and the Liberal Justice Theory of Torts
Alan Calnan*
INTRODUCTION
All torts scholars seem to agree that tort law’s bases of liability consist of fault
and strict liability. They also seem to agree that fault requires blameworthiness while
strict liability does not. They even seem to agree that strict liability is based on public
policy concerns like deterrence and loss spreading. But this is where the consensus ends.
Ask a group of tort scholars to explain the relationship between fault and strict
liability and the responses are likely to be sharply split. An economist might reply that
strict liability—assigned on the basis of efficiency—should be the rule and fault, if it is to
apply at all, but a reluctant and occasional exception.1 A moralist, however, would likely
give the opposite opinion—that fault, defined as deontological culpability, should be the
rule and strict liability the exception.2
Ironically, both economists and moralists often base their views on liberal
principles. Economists rely on the political dimension of liberalism, arguing that
government generally should not intervene in free market transactions,3 but if it must, it
should do so only with clear, efficient tort rules that maximize social welfare.4 Not
surprisingly, moralists rely on the moral dimension of liberalism—the part that focuses
on the individual. They contend that tort law should promote private rights and freedoms
by creating and enforcing personal responsibilities.5

*

Professor of Law, Southwestern Law School. I want to thank the faculties at Wake Forest University
School of Law and Southwestern for permitting me to present earlier drafts of this paper at faculty
workshops and for offering many thought-provoking comments. I also want to thank Jeff Lipshaw for
reading a prior draft and providing helpful written commentary. Finally, I must give a special nod of
recognition and appreciation to my colleague Byron Stier, who not only read several versions of this piece,
presented many probing questions on its structure, scope and content, and offered both written and verbal
ideas for making it better, but who also gave generously of his time to listen to my rants and share his own
views on torts, liberalism and beyond, all while maintaining an infectious enthusiasm and an irrepressible
sense of humor. Any errors that remain reflect my stubborn refusal to see or accept their wisdom.
1
See, e.g., GUIDO CALABRESI, THE COST OF ACCIDENTS 250-51 (1970); WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD
A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW 293-94 (1987); RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC
ANALYSIS OF LAW 166 (3d ed. 1986); Steven P. Croley & Jon Hanson, Rescuing the Revolution: The
Revived Case for Enterprise Liability, 91 MICH. L. REV. 683, 767-86 (1993).
2
See ERNEST J. WEINRIB, THE IDEA OF PRIVATE LAW 171-83 (1995); Arthur Ripstein, The Division of
Responsibility and the Law of Tort, 72 FORDHAM L. REV. 1811, 1820-21 (2004).
3
See Croley & Hanson, supra note 1, at 688-89.
4
See John C.P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513, 544-45 (2003).
5
See Stephen R. Perry, The Moral Foundations of Tort Law, 77 IOWA L. REV. 449, 507-12 (1992);
Richard W. Wright, The Grounds and Extent of Legal Responsibility, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1425, 1429-34
(2003); Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs, and Recourse in the Law of Torts, 51 VAND. L. REV. 1, 4-5
(1998); see generally Richard S. Markovits, Liberalism and Tort Law: On the Corrective-Justice-Securing
Tort Law of a Rights-Based Society, 2006 U. ILL. L. REV. 243 (analyzing “the tort-related moral obligations
of the members of and participants in a liberal, rights-based society and the tort-related constitutional
obligations of such a society's government(s).”).
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Unfortunately, these liberal perspectives appear not only potentially at odds with
each other,6 but also internally inconsistent with the positions they have been enlisted to
support. Though liberal economists prefer the market’s invisible hand to the state’s quite
visible helping hand, their desired liability regime—strict liability—seems to invite
greater government involvement in and more burdensome regulation of private action
than a regime based on fault.7 Likewise, while liberal moralists pay lip service to faultbased liability, some theorists among them have argued that a true libertarian tort system
should be grounded in strict or even absolute liability.8
At first, it may appear that liberalism itself is the source of such confusion. With
its “do-your-own-thing” mentality, liberalism can come off as indeterminate, or worse,
substantively vacuous. But there are other problems at work here—problems that
preclude such a snap judgment. For one thing, both economists and moralists have
fragmented liberalism and selectively transformed their chosen pieces into onedimensional analyses. The trouble is, tort law is not one-dimensional. Because it is
created and applied by the state to right private wrongs, tort law is necessarily both
political and moral. Thus, it cannot be accurately explained or adequately justified
without an account of each aspect of its dual nature.
In addition, both combatants have applied their already limited liberal
perspectives in a decidedly restrictive manner, typically concentrating their attention on
the actors who inflict harm and virtually ignoring the victims who suffer it. Although
each camp has its own objective—for economists, to pursue optimal deterrence and for
moralists, to punish wrongdoers—both see tort cases in essentially unilateral terms.9
However, torts are not unilateral events, but complicated bilateral power struggles. In
resolving these struggles, one simply cannot deter or punish one party without also
empowering, enriching or immunizing the other. Thus, any liberal approach that
addresses the freedom of only one disputant is virtually predestined to be incomplete and
unfulfilling.
Perhaps the biggest problem with these liberal tort theories is the illiberal and, for
lack of a better word, un-American value systems they seek to serve. Economists
embrace liberalism not for its own sake, but to achieve the “higher” ends of utilitarianism
and efficiency. But such values seem awkwardly out of place in “the land of the free and
the home of the brave”—the land of Big Macs and Big Oil, ozone and Oxycontin, Botox
and buffalo extinction, clear-cutting and credit cards, self-help and supersizing, Las
Vegas and Love Canal, Hummers and haute couture, and Chia Pets and channel-surfing.
Similarly, deontological moralists endorse liberalism as a necessary precondition to some
6

A liability regime committed to social utility may have to sacrifice the private rights of certain citizens.
For example, a tort rule that protects an abnormally dangerous but socially useful activity like oil refining
may efficiently distribute fuel but also produce pollution that will harm the health and property of
surrounding landowners. Likewise, a regime committed to a policy of laissez faire may face difficulty
inculcating moral values. Thus, a tort rule that rejects a duty of easy aid may promote individual autonomy
but also fail to instill values of respect, care or benevolence.
7
The burden here is two-fold. Unlike negligence, strict liability covers not just specific acts, but entire
activities. Thus, the mere participation in these activities makes one susceptible to liability. Because strict
liability is easier than negligence to prove, such activities also are more likely to invite lawsuits and more
likely to result in findings of liability.
8
See Jules Coleman & Authur Ripstein, Mischief and Misfortune, 41 MCGILL L.J. 91, 102 (1995).
9
This point has not gone unnoticed by others. See Goldberg, supra note 4, at 554-55, 577 (discussing the
asymmetrical, agent-focused nature of both economic and corrective justices theories).
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greater, universal conception of the Good. But given our heterogeneity and pluralism,
which has fostered division over such basic questions as abortion, assisted suicide,
immigration policy, gay marriage and the death penalty, not to mention the tort issue of
imposing a duty to aid, does anyone really believe that a moral unity beyond liberalism
itself actually exists or could ever be found?
These problems obviously leave liberal tort theory in a precarious state. Yet they
do not necessarily compel its demise. Indeed, in this article, I shall offer a modified
liberal tort theory that not only overcomes the pitfalls of its predecessors, but also better
reconciles its competing theories of fault and strict liability.
I call this new theory the liberal justice theory of torts.10 Unlike previous theories,
it takes a holistic approach to liberalism which encompasses both the political and the
moral sides of tort law’s dual personality. In addition, it looks to justice concepts both to
avoid the prevailing trend toward unilateralism and to illuminate the relational and
bilateral aspects of all torts. Finally, it does all of this using a “classic” liberal perspective
that has as its only objective the protection and promotion of liberty.11
10

I presented some of the pieces of this theory in Alan Calnan, In Defense of the Liberal Justice Theory of
Torts: A Reply to Professors Goldberg and Zipursky, 1 NYU J.L. & Lib. 1023 (2005).
11
I use “classic” here in two different senses, one for each dimension of liberalism. Morally, classic
suggests a longstanding commitment to individual rights and responsibilities that can be traced back to
ancient Greece and Rome. Politically, classic conveys the typical and well-accepted view that government
generally should not interfere with private interests.
Combining these connotations may seem inconsistent and controversial. After all, the ancients,
though they spoke of rights and duties, often used law to compel virtuous behavior. Still, there is no reason
why these ideas must be taken together as a whole. While the ancients often failed to differentiate among
various fields of intellectual inquiry, their moral views concerning the individual certainly were
comprehensive enough to stand apart from their views on government and politics. History supports this
conclusion. During the Middle Ages, the ancients’ moral philosophies actually were embraced by English
jurists who gradually integrated them into the common law, including the common law of torts, where they
later were received into American law. See generally ALAN CALNAN, A REVISIONIST HISTORY OF TORT
LAW: FROM HOLMESIAN REALISM TO NEOCLASSICAL RATIONALISM (2005)(describing the development of
tort law from classic liberal sources). By contrast, though the ancients planted the seeds of democracy, their
political institutions did not have a direct and immediate impact on Anglo-American political traditions,
which sprouted from feudalism, were nurtured by later philosophers like John Locke, Adam Smith and
John Stuart Mill, and blossomed during the Glorious and American Revolutions.
Some critics also might find controversy in each individual usage of classic liberalism. For
example, many scholars believe that Aristotle’s Greece was not liberal at all, but was strictly
communitarian. They also believe that these two political conceptions are irreconcilable. I disagree, at least
in part. While it is true that the Greeks revered the polis and sought to promote it, they also recognized the
need for rights. As Fred Miller Jr. has shown, Aristotle’s understanding of justice was based not just on
objective “natural” rights, but also on subjective claim rights—like the right to corrective justice—that
could be pressed against others. See Fred D. Miller Jr., Aristotle’s Theory of Political Rights, in
ARISTOTLE AND MODERN LAW 309 (Richard O. Brooks & James Bernard Murphy eds., 2003). Moreover,
although the Greeks emphasized man’s social nature, their idea of communitarianism, or at least something
very close to it, is not necessarily inconsistent with liberalism. Indeed, the two concepts are actually
symbiotic. As Hayek recognized, communities create the preconditions for individual action. See 2
FRIEDRICH A. VON HAYEK, LAW, LEGISLATION , AND LIBERTY 2 (1976); FRIEDRICH A. VON HAYEK, THE
CONSTITUTION OF LIBERTY 62-67 (1960); FRIEDRICH A. VON HAYEK, INDIVIDUALISM AND ECONOMIC
ORDER 22-24 (1948); see generally C.R. McCann, Jr., F.A. Hayek: The Liberal as Communitarian, 15 REV.
OF AUSTRIAN ECON. 5 (2002)(arguing that Hayek’s philosophy was one of communitarian liberalism). They
generate opportunities for choice and customs, traditions and values to guide their selection. These
conditions, in turn, inculcate in the citizenry moral sensibilities which identify certain choices as good or
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I have chosen this perspective for several reasons. One is history. As I have
argued elsewhere, early tort law was directly adapted from the liberal justice ideas of
Aristotle, Justinian, Aquinas and a host of other ancient and medieval thinkers.12 Another
reason is constancy. As noted above, corrective justice—a critical feature of Aristotelian
liberalism—has existed in tort law since its inception and remains one of its defining
characteristics.13 Yet another reason is consistency. Despite its ancient heritage, liberal
justice theory contains a belief-system that I believe still resonates with the values of
many if not most Americans. The final reason is necessity. While many modern liberals
have explored the moral and/or political dimensions of liberalism, few have grappled
with its dualism of strict law and equity and none has attempted to make this dualism a
central feature of tort law.
Since strict liability has been the most elusive part of tort law’s formal structure, I
will attack that enigma head on. Specifically, my objective is to posit a liberal justice
theory of strict liability which not only fits comfortably within the existing fault matrix,
but also supports a comprehensive metatheory of torts.
My thesis, in short, is that strict liability is a moral-political concept that must be
implemented in a two-step process. The first step is to determine whether the parties’
encounter and its effects were consensual. Under liberal justice theory, one who consents
to an act or activity risk is not wronged. Thus, she has no claim-right against the actor
and no right to expect protection from the state. This is true even if the conduct of the
risk-creator appears to be objectively unreasonable. Given the power and priority of
consent, liberal justice theory requires that this issue always be litigated first. If consent
exists, the consenter is held strictly liable for her own loss, irrespective of the fault of her
counterpart.
If no consent is found, or if it is not an issue, liberal justice theory then
implements a scheme of reasonableness, grounded in concepts of strict law and equity, to
determine the actor’s liability. Strict law creates categorical rules that forbid, inhibit or
sanction certain people, activities or relations that pose the greatest and surest threats to
freedom and equality. These rules are substantive. They expand duties, heighten
standards of care, extend causal responsibility and limit or eliminate defenses. Equity
expands strict law when its application would prove unjust under a particular set of facts.
Thus, even when a person, activity or relationship is not covered by a strict substantive
rule, equity may episodically impose strict procedural requirements on actors who hold
an unfair advantage in the trial of their actions. Because litigation itself is a threat to the
freedom of the loser, the ad hoc adjustment of procedural burdens serves to correct an
bad. Only when these conditions are set is it possible to operate a liberal system where people exercise the
freedom to choose and accept the responsibility to own up to the consequences of their actions.
As for the other “classic” liberal usage—that government generally should stay out of private
affairs—I endorse a weak form of paternalism consistent with the Millian harm principle. Egalitarian
liberals and libertarians might take umbrage with this usage, arguing for greater or lesser paternalism.
However, because my usage stands at the midpoint between these two extremes, and represents the
mainstream of liberal political thought, it aptly earns the “classic” moniker. In any event, switching to one
of these extreme forms of liberalism would not alter the basic structure of my liberal justice theory; rather,
as I will show within, it would only expand, narrow or eliminate the policy-based exceptions to the consent
theory within this paradigm. See infra II.B.1.
12
See CALNAN, supra note 11.
13
See generally Calnan, supra note 10 (rebutting various critiques of corrective justice and explaining its
continued relevance to modern tort law).
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important imbalance between the parties and restores them to a state of moral and
political equality.
I will present this argument in two parts. In Part I, I summarize the philosophical
foundations of liberal justice theory in general, and of liberal-justice strict liability in
particular. Then, in Part II, I sketch out in greater detail the contours of my metatheory. I
conclude by identifying some implications of this project and highlighting the work yet to
be done.
I.

THE PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS OF LIBERAL JUSTICE THEORY

Tort law is a social mechanism which mediates the relationships between citizens
in conflict and between those citizens and the state. Strict liability, in particular, mediates
these relationships in a way that appears unequal. By definition, it empowers the state,
which in turn empowers certain persons, to treat some citizens more harshly than others.
Although the modern “theory” of strict liability justifies such disparate treatment only on
public policy grounds, liberal-justice strict liability offers a comprehensive philosophical
explanation for this apparent anomaly.
As I shall demonstrate below, liberal-justice strict liability starts from values of
freedom, equality and security. It assembles these values into standards of reasonableness
and justice, which govern the private and public relationships falling within their ambit.
In the private sphere, liberal-justice strict liability relies on ancient principles of general
and particular injustice to explain why certain victims deserve more assistance, and
certain wrongdoers deserve more restraint, than their counterparts in the tort system. It
also explains why those who voluntarily choose injustice do not deserve the same
deference, but receive strict treatment of their own. Finally, in the public realm, liberaljustice strict liability uses principles of distributive justice to make some laws more
burdensome than others, and concepts of strict law and equity to rigidly enforce or
leniently expand or relax the law when so required.
A. Reasonableness and Justice
As Aristotle once observed, political justice can exist only “among people who
are associated in a common life with a view to independence, and who enjoy freedom and
equality.”14 This seemingly simple statement locates the three core values of liberaljustice strict liability: freedom, equality and by implication, security. Freedom is a state
of choice and action which gives individuals the power of autonomous will and selfdetermination, and with it, the rights and responsibilities of moral agency. Security is
merely a form of negative freedom—specifically the freedom to be left alone by others. It
reinforces the power of self-determination by protecting people from outside incursion.
Equality stands on different ground. Although it applies to freedom, it is not, in itself, an
aspect of freedom. Instead, it (1) guarantees that all people enjoy freedom, thus
establishing their basic dignity and worth as moral agents, and (2) sets criteria for
coordinating freedoms among individuals in a political association.
Of course, these values are not always harmonious. They can and often do come
into conflict, especially in tort cases. One person’s exercise of freedom is frequently a
14

ARISTOTLE, THE NICOMACHEAN ETHICS 165 (J.E.C. Welldon trans., Prometheus Books 1987).
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threat to the security of someone else. Likewise, one’s assertion of equality may operate
to limit the freedom of those with extraordinary powers or needs. The goal of tort law is
to determine how to resolve these conflicts. This is difficult enough in ordinary cases of
negligence. It is even more pronounced, however, in cases of strict liability, where the
law’s aspiration—of treating one party more harshly than others—is itself seemingly
inimical to the law’s core values. In this situation, it is especially important for the law to
rely for its liability judgments on some defensible standard or standards of evaluation.
In liberal justice theory, reasonableness serves as the ultimate standard of both
law and conduct. According to Aristotle, reasonableness has two forms. Intuitive reason
is the innate capacity to discover first principles.15 It searches for truths that are objective,
universal and timeless, and not tied to changing social circumstances or shifting social
policies. Practical reasonableness, on the other hand, is the quest for truth in particular
factual settings where the first principles are too vague, too general or simply
inapplicable.16 Where first principles do exist, practical reasonableness seeks to apply
them to the facts in a manner which most closely fulfills their purpose or spirit. Where,
however, such principles are absent, practical reasonableness examines the facts in the
light most favorable to any “bordering” principles, and then proceeds inductively to the
creation of a new general principle.17
In a liberal legal system, intuitive reason reveals several “natural” truths about
human social behavior.18 These truths are not unique to American tort law, but instead
have guided some of the oldest and most revered legal systems, including Justinian’s
Roman Corpus Juris Civilis19 and England’s burgeoning common law. As the Corpus
first declared, and Bracton later observed in his thirteenth-century treatise on English law,
reasonableness requires people to (1) live honestly, (2) do no harm to others, and (3) treat
others justly.20
Not surprisingly, each principle ingrains and enforces the three values of
liberalism. The “honesty” precept promotes positive freedom by fostering consensual
exchange. On a social plane, this injunction creates the condition of trust necessary for
forming a democratic social contract, which in turn guarantees the freedom and equality
absent in a state of nature. On a more personal level, it ensures that people are not duped
15

Id. at 193-94, 204.
Id. at 196-99.
17
For example, a society that punishes unjustified killing but rewards creative effort would have to
reconcile these principles in deciding whether to allow a murderer to profit from a book about her crime.
18
I am not contending that that the ensuing list is exclusive. Certainly, communitarian cultures could
fashion of list of truths different from and significantly at odds with the one provided. There also may be
other truths common to all or most liberal cultures. What I am arguing is that the provided list is the one
developed by our classic liberal ancestors and later adopted by the founders of Anglo-American tort law.
19
The Corpus is a compilation of ancient Roman law commissioned by Emperor Justinian in the sixth
century B.C. It consists of three parts: the Code (a collection of imperial statutes and decrees), the Digest (a
compendium of treatise fragments and juristic opinions) and the Institutes (a student textbook). See
HAROLD J. BERMAN, LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION 128
(1983).
20
See Medieval Sourcebook: The Institutes of Justinian, 535CE, at 3 (visited July 27, 2006)
<http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/basis/535institutes.html#I.%20Justice%20and%20Law (Code’s
Institutes); HENRY DE BRACTON, DE LEGISBUS ET CONSUETUDINIBUS ANGLIAE (BRACTION ON THE LAWS
AND CUSTOMS OF ENGLAND) 25 (c. 1300) (visited October 15, 2001)
<http://bracton.law.cornell.edu/bracton/Common/index.html (Bracton’s treatise).
16
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into making involuntary choices or forgoing opportunities on the basis of incomplete or
inaccurate information.
The “harm” precept, by contrast, promotes security and equality, and indirectly
negative freedom, by prohibiting nonconsensual encounters. Under this precept, an actor
must treat others as moral agents—ends worthy of dignity and respect—and not merely
as instruments to be used as means to the actor’s own ends.
Finally, the “justice” precept serves as a sort of master principle informing and
enveloping the other two. Indeed, its breadth bespeaks its importance, which will be
addressed in greater depth momentarily. For now, it is enough to note that justice not
only compels the requirements of honesty and no-harm, it fills whatever voids exist
between them, delegating and coordinating freedoms to ensure that each and every party
to a social encounter receives what she is due.
Through these precepts, reason aims to guide mankind toward a mean state of
equality and proportion, and away from the extremes of excess and deficiency.21 This
mean applies to every type of human action, and guides every step of each action.
All actions have four components: conditions of external and internal freedom
which allow the actor to act, an end, a chosen means of achieving that end, and a
consequence for the actor and for the world around her.22 Reason seeks balance at each
phase. It promotes the conditions of external freedom—equality and security—by
forbidding the extremes of absolute autonomy on the one hand and absolute subservience
on the other. It also promotes the conditions of internal (moral) freedom: first, by
securing the physical prerequisites to agency (rational capacity, life and health), and
second by requiring a mental state or state of will necessary for balanced action—
specifically, that state which permits the actor to pursue her instincts and fulfill her needs
without becoming a slave to her passions. Reason informs the means of acting by judging
not only the efficacy and integrity of the act, but also how well the act balances the
competing interests of others. Finally, even when all else is right, reason still evaluates
the act’s ends and consequences.
Ends, however, are harder to judge. Since reasonable people can disagree about
what constitutes a good life, the evaluation of ends and consequences will depend on the
value system of the society in which the action occurs. Liberal democratic states typically
remain neutral about ends, opting instead to protect the conditions of freedom necessary
for each citizen to pursue her own conception of the good. Nevertheless, even liberal
states judge some ends and consequences, at least in an exclusionary way. Specifically,
they prohibit ends designed to curtail or destroy the ends of others (intentional harms),
and they condemn consequences that, although efficacious for the actor, have an unfair
impact on others.
If intuitive reason requires the search for the mean and fixes it permanently at the
mid-point on the scale between excess and deficiency, practical reason establishes
different scales for different acts and adjusts these scales as circumstances change. For
example, the welfare scales for drinking poison, on the one hand, and imbibing water, on
the other, are drastically different. Although both poison and water can be dangerous if
ingested in excessive quantities, the mean of reasonable ingestion for poison would be
21

See ARISTOTLE, supra note 14, at 63, 150-53.
This description of action draws from Kant’s Metaphysics of Morals. See IMMANUEL KANT, THE
METAPHYSICS OF MORALS 185-213 (Mary Gregor trans., Cambridge Univ. Press 1991)(1797).
22
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much lower than the mean for imbibing water. Even the same act may have different
means depending on the context of its performance. Thus, the mean speed for reasonable
driving may be quite low when the vehicle is operated on curvy streets in bad weather
and around a lot of people, but quite high when operated on a flat, even surface in good
weather in a barren desert.
In these examples, the means are circumstantial. But they need not be. Sometimes
means can be normative. For example, certain cultures encourage or require body
piercings as symbols of beauty or status, while others consider this practice offensive.23
Even within the same culture, values and tastes may change the mean gradually over
time. American culture traditionally discouraged all body piercings for men, and tolerated
only ear piercings for women. Today, body piercing is far more common and accepted
for everyone.24 As a result, practical reason has shifted both the scale and the
“reasonable” mid-point for this behavior.
The mean of reasonableness applies not just to the types of self-regarding acts
discussed above. It also applies to relations. Sometimes relations are formed unilaterally,
as when an actor imposes risk or inflicts harm upon another without her consent. Other
times, relations are formed with the consent of both parties. In either case, the relation is
a concern of justice, which determines the amount of freedom due to each party. In fact,
justice is the mean state of a relation, apportioning freedoms on the bases of equality and
proportionality.
As with self-regarding acts, the mean for relations is often socially or politically
determined. In liberal democracies, this mean is fixed by rights and duties. Rights are
markers of freedom; duties are symbols of freedom restriction. Since rights and duties are
correlative—limiting one’s freedom to the exact same extent as they empower another—
every right-duty coupling establishes the reasonable mean state of freedom for that
relation. An act which violates this mean disturbs the relation’s moral equilibrium. The
actor takes more freedom than she deserves. Thus, justice reaches up to rein her in,
restricting her freedom to bring her back down to the mean of equality. The victim, in
turn, receives less freedom than she is due. Thus, justice reaches down to lift her up,
affording her the extra freedom necessary to protect or restore her interests.
Because justice regulates relations, it also regulates law, which establishes a
public relationship between people and their government. When people enter a political
association, they give up their natural liberties in return for equality and security. The
state then distributes freedoms and freedom restrictions back to its citizens in the form of
rights and duties. Justice—more specifically, distributive justice—determines the proper
manner of this distribution.
Distributive justice operates on a principle of proportional equality. Although it
recognizes that people are morally equal, and thus entitled to freedom and security as
matter of natural right, it also acknowledges that they do not always deserve the same
amount of freedom all of the time. There are certain circumstances in which certain
people deserve more or less freedom than others. In these situations, the law may be
stricter or more lenient than normal. It must, in short, proportion its relative distributions

23

See Body Piercing, in WIKIPEDIA (visited July 28, 2006)
<http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Body_piercing#Body_piercing_today.
24
See id.
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of freedom in accordance with an objectively unequal geometric ratio determined in
advance.25
The trick is in knowing how to set this ratio. Many moral philosophers argue that
distributive justice should permit inequalities created by choice and action and correct
only those conditions which are beyond people’s control. In other words, the state should
use its distributive power to fix the ill-effects of luck and not to undo the unwanted
consequences of agency.26 Although this scheme seems consistent with the tenets of
liberal justice theory, it also seems incomplete, at least as it applies to private actions.
Nonconsensual threats to autonomy are beyond the victim’s control. Thus, the threatened
party needs and deserves the freedom necessary to protect and vindicate her rights. Those
who, by choice and action, precipitate these nonconsensual encounters, however, should
not be rewarded for their illicit initiative. Indeed, no one would excuse a tax or welfare
cheat because she found a way to beat the system. When such parties use their autonomy
to exceed social norms and infringe the rights of others, they deserve to be brought back
down to the standard of equality, just as potential victims deserve to be lifted up.
Distributive justice serves both purposes. It allocates extra benefits to the vulnerable and
extra burdens to the powerful to keep the parties in balance.
So if control merely limits access to distributive justice, and luck merely activates
it, we have yet to determine the criteria by which distributions, including unequal
distributions, can be made. To have any weight, an unequal distribution must comport
with practical reason. Yet, as Aristotle noted, there are many criteria which practical
reason might approve.27 Ultimately, the choice comes down to values. Those who value
hard work will likely agree to make effort a basis for giving the industrious more freedom
than others. Those who value wisdom might choose age or education level as the
appropriate distributive criterion. In American society, which values liberty first and
foremost, we use merit, risk and need to adjust distributions.28
Each of these criteria comports with liberal justice theory. Merit is the nonharmful
and efficacious use of freedom toward some legitimate end. Risk is the external
manifestation of one’s positive freedom that threatens the security (negative freedom) of
another. Need is the vulnerability of one’s freedom or security to other agents or external
forces. When conduct is meritorious, it is left unrestricted or even rewarded. However,
when it creates abnormal risks or needs for others, practical reason permits
“extraordinary” adjustments to the parties’ freedoms, even though these distributions are
arithmetically unequal, because inequality and injustice would result without them.29
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At first, this view has some appeal. People generally value vested interests—like life or bodily
integrity—more than lost opportunities—like the option of pursuing the benefits of future action. But what
26
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In sum, reasonableness establishes a standard of justice which governs private
encounters and the public law which regulates them. Although this standard is grounded
in first principles, it permits adaptations as circumstances and equities require. For some
actors, activities or relations, reasonableness creates mandates that are stricter than
normal. In the next section, we shall identify the actions and other situations which
warrant special treatment, and in the last section, examine the liberal justice concepts that
justify this move toward strict liability.
B. General and Particular Injustice
happens when liberty itself is used to protect a vested interest, as where a person acts in self-defense against
an apparent assault or a driver suffering a heart attack negligently speeds to get to a hospital? One could say
that the actor’s liberty interest here is really just an aspect of security, so the entire question simply reduces
to a relative comparison of security interests. However, one also could say that any voluntary affirmative
action, no matter its objective, is still a fundamental exercise of the actor’s liberty, and thus is qualitatively
different from the endangered party’s passive interest in being secure. If so, it seems undeniable that, under
these exigent circumstances at least, the actor’s liberty interests might override the security interests of her
potential victims.
Indeed, one could make the case that even less “defensive” liberty interests might outweigh
competing security interests. Liberty and security are not ends in themselves, but merely means to the end
of happiness. Admittedly, the security interest in life is indispensable to that end, since happiness cannot be
pursued without it. But the same is not true of interests in bodily integrity and mental tranquility. Pain,
impairment and disability may inhibit the attainment of certain life plans, but they do not automatically
foreclose those plans or prevent the formation of new ones. Liberty interests seem to share the same sliding
scale characteristic. If, as Aristotle argued, liberty of action is indispensable to virtue, and virtue is
indispensable to happiness, then neither virtue nor happiness is possible in a life of complete passivity. See
ARISTOTLE, supra note 14, at 24, 38. Indeed, since virtue arises only from a habit of committing virtuous
acts, even less complete restrictions on liberty may severely inhibit the pursuit of a Good and happy life.
See id. at 42-44.
Indeed, the more central the act to the actor’s conception of the Good, the more serious the act’s
deprivation will be. For folks who view freedom as the highest Good, liberty is simply more valuable than
security. This idea is perhaps best expressed in Patrick Henry’s proclamation: “Give me liberty or give me
death!” It explains why this country was founded in revolution and why its citizens continuously have been
willing to die in its defense. But it tells us much more than that. It reveals truths about the human condition
that range from the sublime to perhaps the ridiculous. It explains not only why police, fire and emergency
personnel risk their lives in pursuit of an altruistic or heroic ideal, but also why people seek the live-life-tothe-hilt fulfillment of sky-diving, mountain-climbing and drag-racing even in the face of serious injury or
possible death.
I do not mean to suggest that security interests in bodily integrity are insignificant, or even that
liberty always tops security in a hierarchy of value. Instead, my contention is that the relationship between
liberty and security is too contextual to be prejudged. To assess that relationship, one must consider a
number of other factors, like the specific sub-types of liberty and security at issue, the ends to which they
are directed, their values in promoting those ends, and the extent of their potential impairment when they
come into conflict. When this is done, it becomes clear that liberty or action rights routinely receive priority
over security rights, including rights to bodily integrity. For example, pharmaceutical companies may
market drugs, auto makers may market cars and cutlery manufacturers may market knives even though they
know, or could foresee, that their products will injure or kill some of their customers. In each case, the
actor’s right to act is not determined solely by the security interests of the endangered. Rather, it is
determined by balancing the parties’ respective interests and assessing whether, under all of the
circumstances, it is fairer for the actor to impair the interests of the recipient, or for the recipient to impair
the interests of the actor. While the nature of each right is important, it certainly is not conclusive. Indeed,
the variations in analysis are so broad and frequent, it is hard to see what advantage the “preferred security”
rule offers to the decisionmaker.
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By establishing standards of evaluation, reason and justice do not just guide
human action; they also identify actions which deserve correction and punishment.
Aristotle argued that no action can be praised or blamed unless it is knowing, voluntary
and within the actor’s power of control.30 The coexistence of these characteristics ensures
that the act is an expression of the actor’s will, and not an event thrust upon her by other
agents or forces. In addition to these “will” characteristics, actions, to be reasonable, have
to strive toward a mean, and not exhibit excess and deficiency.31 This “mean”
characteristic applies to the actor’s ends (choices), means (actions) and consequences
(outcomes). Actions that are “willful” and “imbalanced” are unreasonable, and thus
susceptible to moral condemnation.
Conduct does not have to be fully knowing to be “willful” in the liberal justice
sense of that term. As Aristotle pointed out, acts done in ignorance are equally culpable.32
Ignorance here can mean ignoring knowledge one already possesses, or ignoring
knowledge possessed by others, if its acquisition is reasonably feasible. Either way, the
conduct is willful in that the actor proceeds with the knowledge that his knowledge is
incomplete or unused.
Aristotle further subdivided wrongful actions into categories of general and
particular injustice.33 General injustices deviate from virtues like courage, temperance
and equanimity. Since these virtues were enforced by Greek law, Aristotle also called
these wrongs unlawful.34 Such general or unlawful injustices take two forms. Most
unlawful actors display imbalance in the means by which they pursue their ends. People
might drink to socialize, celebrate or enjoy, but the lawbreaker gives in to incontinence
and becomes drunk. Certain acts, however, have no mean. They are wrongful no matter
how “well” they are performed, because the ends to which they are directed are inimical
to the freedom of others.35 These intrinsically wicked acts include such things as adultery,
theft and murder.36 Because the actor’s choice itself is bad, such conduct is strictly
prohibited.
These intrinsically wrongful acts could be condemned on other grounds as well.
First, they violate the natural law principle to do no harm to others. Since the harm
principle is essential both to the rule of law and to the equality and dignity of those who
live under it, any actor who flouts that principle must be dealt with in the strictest
possible manner. Second, such intrinsically wrongful acts run afoul of the risk criterion of
distributive justice. Since intrinsic wrongs are intentionally other-directed, they create a
virtually certain risk of harm. In this way, they deviate farthest from the mean of
relational equality. Thus, the state is justified under the risk criterion in placing its
strictest burdens on such behavior, strongly deterring it in the first instance and decisively
correcting and punishing it after the fact.
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Particular injustices are different. According to Aristotle, an act is particularly
unjust if it violates only the virtue of fairness.37 Thus, even if an actor’s conduct is not
intrinsically bad, it still might be deemed wrongful if it is “willful”, proceeds from a
“grasping” motive and produces unfair consequences for others. Graspingness does not
necessarily imply a malicious motive to hurt or dehumanize. Instead, it implies merely an
intent to enrich oneself at the expense of another.38 Here, the actor’s responsibility is
strict in the more modern sense. It does not stop after the act is selected and completed,
but follows the actor until the act’s effect upon the world is known. It then judges the
actor not for her own moral failings, but for the undeserved moral deficit she inflicts upon
those around her.
If we are to call this strict liability, however, we must be mindful of two important
caveats. First, neither general nor particular injustices are considered “faultless”
indiscretions or justifiable acts limited solely on grounds of public policy. Quite the
contrary. Each is a wrong subject to moral censure. General injustices present the greatest
danger to a liberal-democratic republic. Particular injustices are more insidious.
However, both pose serious threats to the concept of freedom—the first by repudiating
that concept directly, the second by compromising the equality of its distribution among
citizens. Thus, each wrong poses its own special concern for liberal justice.
Second, these wrongs do not just invite moral condemnation; they also invite
correction. Wrongs that injure others are wrongful in two senses. The act itself is
wrongful because it emanates from the actor’s exercise of excessive freedom. It violates
the mean of reasonableness either by striving for an excessively other-directed end or
consequence, or by pursuing an otherwise legitimate end in an excessively other-directed
manner. In addition, the consequence of the act is wrongful because it interferes with the
freedom of another, impairing her body, property, autonomy or opportunity. Where these
two conditions co-exist, corrective justice empowers the injured party to correct the
bilateral wrong—specifically, by taking away the actor’s wrongful gain and restoring her
own wrongful loss.39 In this scheme, wrongdoing certainly helps to identify the actor as
someone who deserves reproval. But that is not its sole function. It also serves as a
necessary precondition to the injured party’s right to correction.
C. No Voluntary Injustice
Not all harms create conditions of need which warrant awards of extra freedom to
the injured. In certain cases, the law is justified in treating such victims more strictly than
others. Indeed, in Aristotle’s view, these injured parties are not victims at all. Instead,
they are merely the voluntary subjects of injustice.
Aristotle states that “a person may be hurt, and may suffer what is unjust,
voluntarily, but he cannot be the voluntary victim of injustice.”40 In so concluding,
Aristotle distinguishes between the morality of the act and the morality of its effect upon
the recipient. For Aristotle, a bad act is a bad act, at least insofar as the actor, God and
the state are concerned. However, when a person voluntarily exposes herself to that bad
37
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act, or voluntarily accepts its consequences, neither the act nor its effects are wrongful to
her, no matter how bad they may appear to others. As Aristotle explains, if a man
voluntarily cuts his own throat, his act is illegal and unjust, but only “to the state, and not
to himself.”41
At first, this result might sound illogical. A person injured by an unjust act
appears to have a claim for corrective justice. At the very least, the excessive risk of the
act and the need for protection it imposes on the recipient seem to qualify the actor for
special regulation and the recipient for extra freedom under a system of distributive
justice. In reality, however, both assumptions are unfounded.
Corrective justice applies only where there is a wrongful gain and a wrongful loss.
However, neither exists when the recipient voluntarily accepts the risky act of the actor.
The recipient’s voluntary choice has two important moral effects. First, it signifies that
the recipient considers the transaction to be an overall gain and not a loss, even if it
exposes her to a risk of harm. Second, the choice licenses the actor to proceed with that
risk, thus legitimating whatever gain she might accrue from the transaction.
The recipient’s choice has an even more profound impact on distributive justice:
it completely removes the transaction from the reach of that system. First, choice-based
losses do not create needs. A need is a vulnerability or freedom deficit. The exercise of an
informed choice, however, is neither. In fact, it is a power which permits the chooser to
promote her interests and pursue her ends. Second, even if voluntary choices created
needs, these needs would not fit the criteria for distributive justice. As was noted earlier,
distributive justice applies only to luck-based needs, not to needs which lie within a
person’s control. No risk could be more controlled than one voluntarily chosen by the
recipient. Thus, if the chooser succumbs to those risks, she may not seek to redistribute
her losses to the state, the risk-creator or anyone else, even if such losses otherwise would
create a need worthy of a distributive dispensation. Here, the law is justified in treating
the chooser strictly, forcing her to live with the consequences of her choice.
D. Strict Law and Equity
The apparent harshness of this approach does not make the law amoral or prove
its insensitivity or arbitrariness. In fact, the strict application of a good law is an
unwavering imperative of justice, and a central tenet of liberal justice theory. Good laws
embody justice by giving each citizen exactly as much freedom as she deserves. Thus,
anytime a lawbreaker or lawmaker deviates from the law she also deviates from justice,
since the deviation inevitably causes some person to receive more or less than her fair
share of freedom. To avoid injustice, then, the law must be strictly enforced against the
lawbreaker and strictly applied by the lawmaker. This is the mandate of rigor iuris or
strict law.42
Because laws have general application, they cannot do justice all of the time.
Sometimes they are too broad, creating behavioral mandates that work unfairness in
41
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specific situations. Other times, they are too narrow, failing to address situations that cry
out for justice. In these scenarios, practical reason requires that the law be relaxed or
expanded. This is the job of equity. Equity creates exceptions when the rules of strict law
are unreasonable and unfair.43
The rule-exception pattern of strict law and equity can be either substantive or
procedural. Substantively, strict law locates the most unjust acts and relations and
subjects them to prohibitive rules. For example, one might turn the natural law harm
precept into a general law forbidding acts intended to harm others. Although such a law
will work well in most cases, there are a few scenarios, like those involving public
necessity or self-defense, where it will not. Here, equity creates exceptions which release
the actor from the law’s strict mandate and permit her to intentionally harm. Yet such
exceptions do not weaken the law or temper its moral credibility. Rather, they strengthen
the law by filling in its moral gaps.
So long as the moral imperatives are sufficiently clear, strict law can have a
number of substantive applications, especially in the civil justice system. Most obviously,
it could apply to conduct forbidden by criminal statute. It also might apply to activities
that create abnormally high risk, since such conduct clearly violates the risk criterion of
distributive justice. It might even apply to certain “special relationships” in which one
party’s knowledge and control over risk places her counterpart in an especially vulnerable
position. In each case, the law might burden the suspect actors with strict responsibilities,
affording them variances only in exceptional circumstances where equity so requires.
These substantive mandates may be accompanied by equally strict procedural
rules. Think of a civil lawsuit as a legally sanctioned assault against another. When the
plaintiff initiates that assault with a claim of negligence, she generally bears the burden to
prove it is justified. Why? Because no prejudgment can be made about such conduct.
Negligence is not wrongful per se, but is wrongful only in the particular manner in which
it is performed. Thus, it is not amenable to any a priori rule. Instead, it must be evaluated
by practical reasoning, and only then, after all of the surrounding circumstances are
considered.
That being said, there certainly are cases where the defendant’s conduct is so bad
the law may not need any proof of fault. As noted above, extremely bad acts are
forbidden by strict law. When strict law’s general rule is violated, our moral instincts
allow us to presume fault from the mere commission of the suspect act. Here, the burden
of proof shifts to the defendant to demonstrate either that the act does not fall within the
general rule or that the surrounding circumstances create the need for an equitable
exception.
Like substantive strict law, this strict procedural scheme finds support in
distributive justice. Procedural rules are burdens on freedom in the sense that they stand
as obstacles to the vindication of the parties’ rights. Thus, they must be distributed justly
in accordance with fair distributive criteria. In an ordinary negligence case, these criteria
remain neutral. Since the defendant’s conduct is not inherently wrongful or abnormally
risky, she does not deserve any special burdens on her freedom, like the burden of
disproving her fault. Likewise, since the plaintiff’s harm is not presumptively wrongful,
she displays no special need for assistance in the “assaultive” attempt to vindicate her
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rights. Thus, it is fair to place on the plaintiff the initial burden of proving that she is
justified in invading the defendant’s interests.
These equities change in two scenarios. First, where the defendant’s conduct is
abnormally risky or presumptively wrongful, the state, through the risk criterion of
distributive justice, is justified in placing on the defendant the burden of justifying or
excusing the offending act. On the other hand, because the plaintiff’s loss is
presumptively wrongful, and the depletion of her freedom presumptively unfair, she
deserves an extra allocation of freedom to restore her to the status quo. Thus, under the
need criterion of distributive justice, the state is justified in alleviating her burden of
proof by shifting all or part of it to the defendant.
In the second scenario, the defendant’s conduct renders the plaintiff incapable of
proving the defendant’s fault, while the defendant exercises exclusive control over the
means of proof. The case of Ybarra v. Spangard44 is a good example. In Ybarra, the
plaintiff entered a hospital to have his appendix removed. Following his surgery, he
developed pain and eventually paralysis in his neck and shoulders. He sued the medical
personnel who participated in the operation, but because he was unconscious during the
procedure, could not identify the true culprits. The California Supreme Court relieved the
plaintiff of the burden of proof, and shifted that burden to the defendants to “smoke out”
the truth.45
The plaintiff here had been injured, and his freedom depleted, by the defendant’s
conduct. By placing the plaintiff under general anesthesia, and later refusing to speak out,
the defendants precluded the plaintiff from acquiring the evidence necessary to prove that
this taking was unjustified. Such conduct created a heightened and abnormal risk that the
plaintiff would be forced to bear the unfair consequences of their interaction. Thus, under
the risk criterion, the state was justified in distributing to the defendants a special burden
of producing the evidence in their control. The plaintiff also needed and deserved special
treatment. He could not vindicate his rights, and restore his freedom, because of the
evidentiary disability imposed upon him by the defendants. Thus, unless he received a
procedural advantage not enjoyed by other litigants, his right to corrective justice would
be lost. The state can and did negate this disability by requiring the defendants to justify
their behavior.
Such procedural adjustments, though unequal in application and onerous in effect,
are not unfair. Indeed, to the extent that they perfect the law when its generality leaves it
susceptible to injustice, they actually keep the law faithful to the dictates of
reasonableness.
II.

A PROPOSED THEORY OF LIBERAL-JUSTICE STRICT LIABILITY

So far, I have identified the values and principles or “raw material” of liberal
justice theory. Grounded in moral and political concepts of reasonableness, liberal justice
supports a number of “strict liability” notions. For example, people who consent to risk
must do so at their peril. The same strict rule typically applies to actors who act without
consent, including those who commit inherently wrongful acts, exploit highly imbalanced
relationships or engage in abnormally risky activities. It even applies to actors who,
44
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though not acting from vice, hold unfair evidentiary advantages over or impose unfair
consequences on others.
Obviously, these strict liability concepts do not comport with the modern view.
Some concepts—like those that apply to deliberately harmful acts and special
relationships—are currently handled under the fault-based theories of intentional tort and
negligence.46 Others—like those dedicated to abnormally dangerous activities—are
presently classified as “nonfault” strict liability, but actually have a firm fault basis.47
Still others—like presumptions and shifted burdens of proof—exist indiscriminately in
both liability regimes.48 And a few—like the doctrines of consent and assumption of
risk—are rarely even recognized as substantive liability concepts, let alone as aspects of
strict liability.49
But what if we were to remove the conceptual constraints of the modern
paradigm? Would a new, more coherent, theory of strict liability emerge? If so, what
would this liberal justice version of strict liability look like and how would it compare to
its predecessor?
My instinct is that this new paradigm would be both familiar and revolutionary.
Because Anglo-American tort law derived from classical liberalism,50 much of the
subject matter of liberal-justice strict liability would remain the same. Thus, actors,
activities and relationships now subject to more onerous liability rules would continue to
face such treatment. However, because tort law’s original liberalism has been corrupted
by other influences,51 the nature, structure and process of strict liability all would change.
In the remainder of this article, I aim to show how.
Before getting started, however, I must offer a few words of caution. Since so
much of liberal-justice strict liability is currently embedded in fault concepts, one cannot
reformulate this area of tort law without demolishing and reconstructing much of the
law’s existing framework. The enormity of this task places two important limitations on
this project. First, I cannot describe in detail all of the facets of a full liberal justice theory
of tort law. I can only highlight its main characteristics. Second, I cannot reconsider all of
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the tort doctrines that might be affected by such a theory. I can only address the ones
most central to the theory’s implementation.
I will start with basics and work toward particulars. Thus, in section A, I will
identify the substantive foundations of this new paradigm. Then, in section B, I shall
discuss the paradigm’s structural features and will address the procedural mechanisms
that make the paradigm complete.
A. Substantive Foundations
The current paradigm of tort law recognizes three substantive bases for assigning
liability: intent, negligence and strict liability. Although both intentional torts and
negligence are fault-based, the bases they use to assign fault are quite different.
Intentional torts are faulty because those who commit them act with a subjective purpose
or knowledge that their conduct will harm others. Negligent acts, by contrast, are faulty
because they violate an objective standard of reasonable care. These differences aside,
each fault-based tort is still different from strict liability, which assigns liability on the
basis of public policy irrespective of fault.
Liberal justice theory has only one substantive foundation: reason. Reason is the
medium for judging all human actions and relations. In a liberal democracy, reason
judges transactions by the way they affect the freedom of the parties. Transactions that
promote freedom are inherently good; those that inhibit freedom are presumptively bad.
Consensual transactions fall into the first category. Consent is an expression of
will by one party to accept the will of another. It has three immanently reasonable,
freedom-enhancing effects. Although these effects are well known, they are too often
overlooked. Thus, it is worth a moment to review them.
First, consent enlarges the freedom of everyone it touches. It transforms the
consenter’s freedom from a dormant, passive state into a state of action, thus allowing her
to obtain intermediate ends in pursuit of her ultimate end of happiness. It also empowers
the consenter’s transactional counterpart. Without consent, the counterpart’s interaction
with the consenter would be intrusive. Consent not only authorizes the counterpart’s
overture, it gives her the ability, along with the consenter, to aggrandize her freedom by
pursuing an end of her own.
Second, consent allocates risk and fixes responsibilities between the parties in the
clearest possible way. All exchanges involve some degree of risk—either of denied
opportunities or of lost or damaged interests. In certain encounters, the parties may
impliedly allocate such risks merely by entering into a common social relationship with a
fixed set of norms and values. In others, the parties may themselves expressly consent to
a particular risk allocation scheme. Either way, consent operates to establish between the
parties a private network of rights and duties which memorializes their wishes and
illuminates their interlocking freedoms.
Finally, consent legitimates transactions and relations, thus removing them from
the realm of social concern. Under the liberal “harm” principle, the primary role of
government is to protect its citizens from unwanted “harmful” intrusions upon their
autonomy. Since consensual transactions promote rather than inhibit the parties’
freedoms, such transactions generally are self-policing. They become susceptible to
outside interference only when they threaten to injure nonparticipants.
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Forced transactions stand on different ground. Lacking consent, they are
automatically suspect. Since there is no organizing principle like consent to
comprehensively and conclusively characterize their moral quality, they remain subject to
the general standard of reasonableness.
As we have already seen, reasonableness imposes the same requirements on all
actors, regardless of the specific nature of their acts. It commands them to avoid excess
and deficiency and to seek the mean of virtue, including most especially the supreme
virtue of justice. Since the requirements are universal, so are the consequences of their
transgression. Any conduct that deviates from the standard of reasonableness necessarily
is imbalanced and unjust. The perpetrator takes more freedom than she deserves and
curtails the freedoms of others without asking for prior consent or making reparations
after the fact. It follows that her actions, even if not deeply immoral, are faulty in at least
the “thin” moral sense that they are unfair.
Nevertheless, faulty behavior is not all the same. It can differ in both kind and
degree. Most conduct, even wrongful conduct, is average. The actor does not choose to
engage in an inherently bad activity. She merely performs her chosen activity poorly. In
doing so, the actor breaches a transactional duty to consider the rights and interests of
others.52 Even in such cases, however, the actor’s poor performance generally does not
create abnormal dangers. Rather, given the customary and reciprocal nature of most
social activities, it merely imposes risks that, while excessive, are fairly familiar and
commonplace. These negligent transgressions certainly are not morally wicked, but they
also are not morally neutral. They are unfair, and thus wrongful, because they give the
actor both a liberty of self-absorption and a power of domination not shared by her victim
or anyone else.
Because there are so many ways of performing these ordinary deeds, they cannot
be regulated by a comprehensive set of detailed rules. Instead, they must be examined for
reasonableness on a case-by-case basis. The general standard of reasonable care
facilitates this process. Fair and flexible, it customizes its requirements to suit the facts
and equities at hand.
The same is not true of certain “extraordinary” activities, relations or actors. In
liberal cultures, acts are extraordinary if they either proceed from an intention to harm or
create an abnormal risk of harm. Ironically, this classification includes both intentional
torts and strict liability activities—conduct which the current paradigm not only
differentiates, but actually places at opposite ends of the fault-liability continuum.53 It
also includes relations, usually covered by negligence law, in which one party enjoys an
abnormal power of control over her especially “needy” counterpart.54 It even includes
some actors who, because of their immaturity or mental incompetence, pose unusually
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By “transactional” duty, I mean a duty which regulates the specific manner in which someone acts
around, towards or with another. Transactional duties lie in the middle of the action-duty continuum, which
begins with pretransactional duties and ends with posttransactional duties. Pretransactional duties regulate
the choice of actions while posttransactional duties regulate responses to the consequences of actions.
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Intentional torts possess all the qualities of strict liability, including an abnormally dangerous act, a
categorical and activity-based focus, an expansive set of duties, proof of only a triggering fact (intent)
irrespective of the actor’s fault, few and narrow defenses and a shifted burden of proof. See Calnan, supra
note 46, at 242-56.
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See supra note 46.
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great dangers to those around them.55 As to these extraordinary actors, activities and
relations, reasonableness has a much more definite and predictable position. Because they
create dangers, hold advantages, aspire to ends or produce consequences that naturally
exceed the relevant mean of acceptability, they are suspicious on principle. Thus,
reasonableness has reason to restrict them with specific and strict rules of responsibility.
All of this leads to a few important conclusions about the possible substantive
bases of a liberal justice paradigm of tort law. Although reason must serve as the
paradigm’s seminal concept, that concept actually generates and supports two narrower
normative standards. One is the standard of consent; the other is the standard of
reasonableness. Because consent promotes free will and individual autonomy, it is
presumptively reasonable. This presumption creates a rule of strict liability for the
consenter. Nonconsensual acts lack such a presumption. Thus, they must be
independently evaluated under the standard of reasonableness. For ordinary permissible
acts, reason makes no prejudgments. Because such acts could be performed in a variety
of acceptable ways, they must be analyzed by practical reason in light of prevailing
norms and circumstances. Other acts create extraordinary risks. Intrinsic and categorical
by nature, these risks are virtually impossible to avoid and especially easy to predict.
Thus, reasonableness creates specific rules to address them.
B. Structural and Procedural Features
Having established the paradigm’s substantive bases, we must now consider its
structure and procedure. Under the current paradigm, tort law’s substance determines its
structure. All torts are first classified as intentional, negligent or strict liability, and then
are further categorized as either fault-based or fault-free. A liberal justice paradigm
would be similar in one respect but different in many others. Like the current paradigm,
the liberal justice model would fit form to substance. But, as I will show below, it would
recognize only two theoretical categories: consent and reasonableness. Strict liability
would not exist outside this dichotomy but within it, substantiating consent theory and
constituting a major sub-category within the theory of reasonableness. In each case, strict
liability would not be a faultless concept, but would be firmly grounded in the morality of
liberal justice.
1. The Consent Theory
Since consent is liberalism’s core concept, one would expect it to enjoy an
important place in any liberal theory of torts. In this regard, my theory simply states the
obvious. But what is less obvious, and what sets liberal justice theory apart, is the key
role that it plays in defining the very structure of all tort law. Under this theory, consent is
not just a tort negator but a paradigm delineator. It serves not simply as a defense to some
other liability theory, but as the exclusive theory for analyzing all consensual
transactions.
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Children engaged in adult activities and adults with permanent mental disabilities are subject to an
average adult standard of care and are held liable for noncompliance even though they are incapable of
meeting that standard and thus are not at fault for their failure to do so. See DOBBS, supra note 46, at 28485, 298-99. In this sense, their liability truly is strict.
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Elevating consent to premier status may seem particularly surprising in a justice
theory grounded in reasonableness. But a closer look reveals the inevitability of this
move. Reasonableness, we have seen, is an objective measure of conduct whose exercise
threatens the freedom of others. Consent, by contrast, is a subjective expression of free
will which actualizes the wills of those who give and receive it. Because consent enlarges
choice and promotes liberty, it is by nature reasonable. Thus, consent does not require
objective moral monitoring; its objective morality is already ingrained. This means that,
although consent derives from reason, it is free from the standard of reasonableness.
In fact, reasonableness has no basis for judging consent. Consent proceeds from
an agent’s subjective appraisal of means and ends. The consenter may desire to encounter
risk for risk’s sake. Or, she may seek to obtain benefits that exceed the attendant risks.
Unless her consent exposes others to harm, there are no objective criteria for measuring
the reasonableness of her choices. Only she can know if her ends comport with her values
or if her chosen means will likely accomplish her ends. Since such evaluations are agentrelative, consent cannot be subordinate to reasonableness but must, at the very least, stand
apart as an independent basis for assigning liability.56
Unfortunately, the current paradigm hides this fact. Whether cast as a privilege to
an intentional tort or as the defense of assumption of risk in negligence and strict liability
cases, consent is only a secondary factor which, even in theory, does not conclusively
determine the ultimate issue of liability. In all theories, the central focus is on the
reasonableness of the defendant’s conduct, not on the parties’ consent. Consent enters the
discussion merely to shed light on that central issue. Even when it is raised, consent does
not end but merely informs the discussion of reasonableness. Indeed, where the conduct
consented to is extremely unreasonable, the issue of consent often is disregarded
altogether on grounds of public policy.
Liberal justice tort theory departs from this approach in several material respects.
First, it requires that the consent issue always be litigated first. Why? Because in
determining the justice of a private encounter, consent always trumps reasonableness.
Acts are unreasonable and thus personally wrongful only if they (1) are governed by a
freedom-limiting duty owed to a specific person, and (2) violate the standard of care
required by that duty. Consent affects the first prong of this analysis. If the dutybeneficiary consents to a known act, risk or consequence, she not only eliminates the
risk-creator’s duty to protect against that hazard, but also bestows upon the risk-creator a
right of action or omission. Without a duty, there can be no tort, even if every other
element of the claimant’s cause of action is satisfied. Thus, from a purely pragmatic
standpoint alone, it makes sense to try the consent issue before doing anything else.
But pragmatism is not the only justification for this approach. It is more firmly
grounded in the morality and politics of liberal justice theory. The order of litigation
signifies the values of the underlying system. The current reasonableness-first approach
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The relationship between consent and reasonableness may vary in a public law context like the criminal
justice system. Here, the inquiry is not simply whether the injured party got what she chose, as it is in the
private law context of tort law, but also whether the injurer’s conduct or the transaction as a whole is
socially harmful. In this situation, reasonableness, as a measure of social welfare, may monitor and even
override consent. See Vera Bergelson, The Right to Be Hurt. Testing the Boundaries of Consent, 65-69
(Rutgers Law School (Newark) Faulty Papers, 2006)(visited July 26, 2006)
<http://law.bpress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/fp/art37 (arguing that consensual acts that violate the recipient’s
human dignity should nevertheless be criminalized because they jeopardize the entire community).
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promotes values of altruism and paternalism. By putting the actor’s conduct at center
stage, and relegating consent to a subordinate role, the modern paradigm creates the
impression that both the government and its citizens may be a responsible for protecting
people against their own choices, even if those people sometimes are denied recovery for
their losses. A consent-first approach reverses this impression. It suggests that people are
responsible for their choices and that neither the government nor other citizens are
obliged or authorized to judge them. This suggestion, in turn, helps to reinforce the
liberal values of liberty and self-sufficiency.
Besides switching the trial order of reasonableness and consent, liberal justice
theory seems to require more specific procedural changes. I envision the following
procedure, though other schemes may be defensible as well.57 If the plaintiff alleges that
the defendant consented to protect her from the harm suffered, she must litigate that issue
in a preliminary proceeding, even if she also alleges that the defendant’s conduct was
unreasonable. If the plaintiff proves the defendant’s consent, the reasonableness issue
becomes moot, and the case is ended. If the plaintiff fails to prove consent, the case then
proceeds to trial on the issue of reasonableness. Here, the parties may introduce any
evidence from the prior proceeding which also relates to the issue of reasonableness.
Regardless of plaintiff’s allegations, the defendant also has the option of asserting
that the plaintiff consented to accept the defendant’s act, condition or consequence. If
both parties raise the issue, each bears the burden of proving her claim. If, as is more
likely, only the defendant raises the consent issue, she alone must substantiate her
assertion in a preliminary proceeding. If she prevails on this issue, she wins the entire
case. If she loses, the case proceeds to its second phase, where the plaintiff’s claim of
unreasonableness will be decided.
In addition to these procedural changes, liberal justice theory makes three
important structural changes to the current paradigm. First, it applies consent to all cases,
not just some. It does this by expanding the scope of consent to its logical extreme:
specifically, to include not only the choice to accept a known act or consequence, as is
true in intentional tort cases, but also the choice to accept a known future risk of harm, as
is frequently the case in negligence. As so expanded, consent eliminates the doctrine of
assumption of risk, replacing its “true choice” form and casting its “no duty” form into
the realm of reasonableness.58
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It has been suggested, in the case of consensual crimes, that the first step should be to identify the
prohibitory norm underlying the offense. See id. at 57. If the act itself violates a prohibitory norm, then
consent should operate only as an exculpatory defense. See id. However, if there is no prima facie moral
prohibition against the act, then consent is inculpatory and its absence should be proven by the prosecution
as an element of the offense. See id. While this scheme may work in the criminal context, it loses merit in
the private justice system of tort law. Unlike a crime, which wrongs the public, a tort is a purely private
wrong, personal to the victim. In this private realm, consent releases the actor from any prohibitory norm
that otherwise might preclude her conduct. Once this prohibition is removed, the actor’s conduct cannot be
wrongful to the consenter, no matter how harmful or antisocial it may be. Here, consent preempts
unreasonableness, not the other way around.
58
“True choice” assumption of risk exists when the plaintiff subjectively knows and appreciates the risk of
harm and voluntarily encounters it, thus effectively choosing to accept the consequences of her decision.
See DOBBS, supra note 46, at 535. By contrast, “no duty” assumption of risk exists irrespective of the
plaintiff’s subjective consent when she elects to participate in an inherently dangerous occupation or
activity and she is injured by one of those intrinsic risks. See id. at 537-38, 540-41, 547-50. Here, courts
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In fact, the recategorization of “no duty” assumption or risk is illustrative of the
second structural change wrought by liberal justice theory. It treats all instances of
“objective” consent as matters of reasonableness. Under current law, consent can be
either subjective or objective. Subjective consent is a voluntary choice made with actual
knowledge and appreciation of the relevant risks.59 Objective consent, by contrast, is an
external manifestation of choice that may or may not reflect the agent’s true will. It binds
the agent not because she authorizes incursions upon her autonomy, but because her
outward behavior limits the autonomy of others.60
To see this more clearly, consider the following hypothetical. Novice, an
inveterate couch-potato, decides for the first time to engage in a game of football. By
participating in the game, she conveys to the other players that she is willing to accept the
normal risks posed by their conduct. They, in turn, rely on her representation in two
ways: initially, by allowing her to join in, and thereafter, by forgoing precautions that
would reduce the game’s ordinary hazards. During the game, an opponent attempting to
defend a pass knocks Novice to the ground and accidentally steps on her finger. In many
jurisdictions, Novice would be barred from recovery under the doctrine of primary
make an objective policy determination that no participant owes to the others a duty to protect them against
these inherent dangers. See id.
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In subjective consent cases, the consenter’s intention resides in his mind. Although the consenter may
deny this intent, his adversary can discover his true mental state by asking questions both of the consenter
and of other witnesses who know him well or to whom he may have confided. Here, the jury can weigh the
credibility of the witnesses, examine the surrounding circumstances and employ their own common sense
to resolve the intention issue. Given the relatively low burden of producing such evidence, and the absence
of any reason to presume intent, it makes sense to force the party alleging consent to have to prove it.
Subjective consent raises two additional issues. One is whether the consenter possessed the
capacity to consent; the other is whether her consent was freely and voluntarily given. Both are necessary
for moral choice and action. To have capacity, the consenter must have actual knowledge or at least the
ability to know and appreciate the consequences of her choices. To have volition, she must possess a power
of choice free of compulsion by internal demons or external forces.
In most situations, these conditions are highly fact-specific. They depend on the characteristics of
the consenter and the circumstances surrounding her expression of consent. Thus, they must be addressed
by the alleging party on a case-by-case basis. In other situations, however, these subissues are amenable to
more categorical analysis. This is true where the consenter belongs to a group that generally lacks the
ability to consent. Here, membership in the suspect group might create a presumption that the consenter’s
consent was nugatory. For example, one might presume that children and the mentally disabled are
incompetent because they possess inherent mental limitations. See Bergelson, supra note 56, at 24. One
also might presume that medical patients and factory workers lack volition because they choose risk under
circumstances of extreme hardship or necessity. See Tunkl v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 383 P.2d 441
(Cal. 1963)(patient); Cremeans v. Willmar Henderson Mfg. Co., 566 N.E.2d 1203 (Ohio 1991)(worker);
Cudnik v. William Beaumont Hosp., 525 N.W.2d 891 (Mich.. Ct. App. 1994)(patient); McCalla v.
Harnischfeger Corp., 521 A.2d 851 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1987)(worker). Such presumptions may be
rebuttable or irrebuttable, depending on the extent of the incapacity or compulsion at issue. The only
requirement is that they reach the right result most of the time.
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Objective consent can be communicated by words, conduct or in writing. Of these forms of expression,
signed agreements present the greatest need for bright-line treatment. Because a contract represents the
most serious formal commitment a person can make—a commitment that not only is expected but intended
to induce the reliance of others—reasonableness requires that we presume consent from the signature and
force the signatory to come forward with evidence in rebuttal. It should be emphasized, however, that the
signatory’s strict liability does not depend on her actual consent, though such consent may be present, but
rather proceeds from her unreasonable interference with the expectations and thus autonomy interests of
those with whom she transacts.
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implied assumption of risk, even though she did not actually know of or subjectively
consent to the risk of such an injury.61 Here, the reliance interest of the other players—
that is, their freedom to include Novice and play the game with abandon without doing
further investigation—is presumed to be greater than Novice’s interest in being protected
from such unexpected risk without doing any investigation of her own.
Even if one questions the truth or wisdom of this presumption, there is no denying
that the interest-balancing on which it is based is clearly a characteristic of
reasonableness. It turns not on Novice’s mental state or the state of her will, but on an
evaluation of the objective social duties that both she and the other players owed to each
other. Did Novice act in a way that would lead a reasonable person to believe that she
actually consented, thus creating in Novice a duty to care about their reactions? Did the
other players reasonably rely on Novice’s expression to their detriment? Did these
players continue to owe Novice a duty of reasonable care to inquire about her experience
or to play the game in an especially careful manner? No matter how the duty balance is
struck, such issues cannot be resolved without consulting prevailing norms and
examining surrounding circumstances; or in other words, without employing practical
reason. Thus, they are better exposed under the rubric of reasonableness than hidden
under the cover of consent.
With the theoretical dividing lines more clearly drawn, the final change gives
those lines more structural stability. Under the current paradigm, one who knowingly and
voluntarily consents to an act, condition, consequence or risk is not necessarily bound by
her choice. Instead, her consent may be overridden on grounds of public policy. These
public policy exceptions to consent take one of two forms.62 Sometimes consent is
ignored in order to punish antisocial acts like intentional torts and recklessness.63 Other
times it is overlooked to regulate transactions that involve great public interest.64
Unfortunately, these exceptions not only weaken the line between consent and
reasonableness, they permit reasonableness to cross over that line and absorb cases in the
other category. As a result, they are conspicuously out of place in a liberal justice system
of tort law.
In fact, such public policy-based consent busters strike at the very core of that
system. Liberal justice theory holds that those who consent are not wronged. This is true
no matter how antisocial the chosen act may be, or how great an interest the state may
have in promoting, regulating or punishing it. Granted, the consenter’s consent cannot
legitimate the act. It remains a public and spiritual wrong that deserves punishment. But
that punishment cannot be imposed by a private party who herself is undeserving.
Instead, it must come from the state in the proper public proceeding. This does not mean
that public interests may never place limits on the private corrective justice of tort law.
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See Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696, 705-06, 711-12 (Cal. 1992)(applying primary implied assumption of
risk to a football injury similar to the one described in the text).
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In the criminal law, a greater variety of public policy arguments have been used to override victim
consent. These arguments have included (1) consensually harmed victims may not be able to provide
military service to the state, (2) they may become public charges, (3) their consent invites breaches of the
peace, (4) their chosen activities produce more social harm than benefit, (5) their choices may undermine
respect for the rule of law, and (6) their choices are immoral. See Bergelson, supra note 56, at 33-42.
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See Wolf v. Ford, 644 A.2d 522, 525 (Md. 1994).
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See id. at 526. Although Wolf cited unequal bargaining power as a third public policy exception to
consent, this circumstance actually tends to show that true consent never existed in the first place.
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Since the state administers the tort system, it can subject that system to a complement of
fair administrative constraints, like duty rules which block claims too multitudinous, too
trivial or too difficult to try.65 What it does mean is that such limits must be carefully
selected, narrowly interpreted and correctly applied so as not to damage the system’s
liberal value structure.
To summarize, a liberal justice consent theory would have both direct and indirect
effects on the current tort system. Besides elevating consent to a more prominent status,
this theory overtly declares that consent is first in a hierarchy of liability determinants.
These changes, in turn, promote other more subtle shifts, like openly endorsing the values
of liberal justice, and increasing the number of cases in which consent is raised and
litigated. This in no way implies that consent will be any easier to prove or that its
procedural priority will preempt potentially meritorious claims. In fact, unless consent is
true, liberal justice has no interest in the other objectives. Thus, the search for consent in
such a system is bound to be even more rigorous than it is today.66
2. The Reasonableness Theory
If a transaction is not consensual, or if the resulting harm does not fall within the
scope of the consent given, neither the transaction nor its consequences can be presumed
reasonable. Instead, they must be judged against the standard of reasonableness.
Reasonableness thus completes the binary structure of a liberal justice paradigm of tort
law. However, the reasonableness theory is not without its own architectonics. Although
always grounded in fault concepts, that theory actually consists of three distinctive
subsclassifications: an Ordinary Liability Matrix bracketed by matrices of Limited and
Strict Liability. Because of space and scope restrictions, I will not address the Limited
Liability scheme here.67 Instead, I will focus on the Ordinary Liability Matrix and its
more rigorous counterpart, the matrix of liberal-justice Strict Liability.
a. The Ordinary Liability Matrix
Most acts that people commit are ordinary. By this I mean that they are
commonly carried on by other people in the same community and do not present an
exceptionally high degree of risk to others. Because they are not intended to harm, they
are not inherently wrongful. Because they reflect community norms, they also are not
conventionally wrongful. They become wrongful, if at all, only when they are ill-suited to
the circumstances in which they are performed. Such cases of circumstantial injustice
cannot be prejudged. Instead, they must be held up to the standard of reasonableness and
evaluated on a case-by-case basis. This is the central feature of the Ordinary Liability
Matrix of liberal-justice tort law.
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See Calnan, supra note 10, at 1066-68.
I envision something of a sliding scale: the greater the probability and magnitude of risk, and the greater
the indicia of coercion, duress or incapacity, the higher the standard and quantum of proof of voluntariness
should be. See also Bergelson, supra note 56, at 29 (advocating a similar sliding scale for criminal cases).
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I have suggested elsewhere that this matrix might provide protections to special actors like children,
owners and occupiers of land and public and quasi-public agents and entities. See Calnan, supra note 46, at
259-60.
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The Ordinary Liability Matrix, like torts in our modern paradigm, must contain a
definite structure—of theory, defense and procedure—for carrying out the determination
of reasonableness. The plaintiff’s theory offers reason-conditions for permitting the
plaintiff to invade and deplete the defendant’s freedom.68 The defendant’s defense offers
counter-reasons for either stopping the plaintiff’s assault or diminishing the degree of her
invasion. Procedure determines the action-conditions that both parties must satisfy to
win; and these conditions, in turn, determine how free or disabled each party will be in
her pursuit of the other.69 Unlike the modern paradigm, however, this matrix is not
identified or defined by the plaintiff’s theory alone. Instead, it consists of the entire
concatenation of these liability-determining ingredients.
The theory of Ordinary Liability initiates the process of practical reasoning by
assembling and organizing the arguments which favor the plaintiff’s assault. These
arguments form two categories: those that establish the defendant’s obligations to protect
and pay the plaintiff and those that trigger the plaintiff’s right to relief from the
defendant. To be persuasive, arguments in the first category must show that the defendant
breached a duty owed to the plaintiff; while arguments in the second must show that the
defendant’s breach caused the plaintiff harm. Assembled together, these arguments form
an elemental structure identical to that which prevails in modern negligence. Because this
structure is old and familiar, one might be tempted to take it for granted. But I think this
would be a mistake. These elements are so fundamental to any liberal justice theory of
torts that they provide the basic starting framework for all torts in that system. Thus, they
deserve a fresh look.
When the defendant’s conduct is ordinary, she has both a right to act and a
responsibility to keep that action reasonably self-contained. The first objective of liberal
justice theory is to find the mean between this right and duty. To strike the correct
balance, one must consider the breadth and depth of the duty. Specifically, to whom is it
owed and what does it require?
The first question is one of scope. It seeks to discover how far into the world the
defendant’s duty extends and how many people it requires the defendant to protect. In a
liberal justice system, both answers depend on the concept of control. Moral virtue is the
choice of actions in conformance with right reason and the power of will to carry them
out. Those who have this power can control themselves and others; those who do not are
vulnerable to control by others. Thus, control brings responsibility to avoid subjugation,
which disturbs the moral equilibrium among autonomous agents.
There are three bases for exerting control over others, and thus for incurring a
duty of care. All require some sort of affirmative action. First, the actor can enter into an
imbalanced relationship in which she is the more powerful party.70 Second, she may
commit an act that creates unreasonable risk and imposes it on others without their
consent.71 Here, the actor’ control is delimited by the scope of risks that she could foresee
prior to acting. Because one can control only what one can foresee, foreseeability shapes
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A reason-condition is a substantive argument, among perhaps several, that one party must present and
prove to justify taking personal or legal action against another. See CALNAN, supra note 11, at 58.
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This special relationship imposes upon the party with greater knowledge and control over risk a duty to
exercise reasonable care toward her more vulnerable counterpart. See DOBBS, supra note 46, at 857, 87576.
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See id. at 334.
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responsibility.72 Third and finally, the actor can act in a way that induces another’s
reliance or places her in a more vulnerable or at least less advantageous position than she
was in before that action.73 In this case the actor controls the other’s fate by influencing
the latter’s behavior or by influencing the behavior of others who might assist her.
Once the scope of the defendant’s duty is defined, the next task is to determine its
content. In short, how much freedom is the defendant required to relinquish for the sake
of others? The answer depends on how far from the mean of equality the defendant’s
conduct deviates. Ordinary actions require ordinary care. Since the defendant’s conduct
only poses a moderate threat to others, she need only take moderate precautions to protect
them, thus only moderately impairing her own freedom of action. As the risk level and
the defendant’s knowledge about that risk increases, so does the defendant’s duty of
care.74 Indeed, as I will discuss in the next section, there comes a point at which neither
the act nor the duty are ordinary. At this point liability turns strict. Likewise, there are
times when the defendant faces an imminent risk of losing one or more of her vital
interests. Here, the exigent circumstances justify relaxing her standard of care.75
Either way, the adjusted duties are not unfair. In each case, they merely require
the defendant to forgo as much of her own freedom as is necessary to avoid a greater loss
of freedom to those around her. If she complies with this mandate, her conduct is
reasonable even though it may result in someone’s injury. If she does not comply, her
breach is unreasonable and thus wrongful in two different senses. Besides exercising
more freedom than she deserves, she fails to accord her victim the ordinary care and
respect expected of members of a liberal democratic community.76
The breach of a limited duty of ordinary care establishes the defendant’s
vulnerability to an action of corrective justice. But neither duty nor breach single out the
plaintiff as the party specially empowered to bring such an action. This right arises only
upon proof of two facts: the plaintiff suffered harm, and the defendant caused it.
The harm element identifies the sufferer as a victim potentially entitled to liberal
justice. In a system committed primarily to protecting equality and freedom, any lapse in
that protection is a matter of state concern. In some cases, the threat to these values may
be so great that one may presume harm from the mere commission of the threatening act.
However, such is not the case with ordinary wrongs. On a broad “activity” level, conduct
which presents ordinary risks is typically legal and customary. Thus, the mere decision to
engage in that conduct does not automatically jeopardize the rights of others. Even on a
narrower “performance” level, ordinary behavior that creates needless risks is neither so
antisocial nor so abnormal that it may be deemed inherently harmful. Thus, an alleged
victim cannot simply cite the misconduct as a basis for recovery. Instead, she must prove
that she sustained some actual impairment of her freedom, like damage to her bodily
integrity, mental tranquility, property, reputation or economic opportunity.77 Only then
will she have been harmed in the liberal-justice sense of that term.
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Of course, proof of harm is not alone sufficient to sustain a right to redress. To be
actionable, that harm must be caused by the defendant’s wrongful act. As noted above,
any wrongdoer who reaps an unjust gain from her misdeed qualifies for corrective action.
However, she may not be corrected by just anyone. Only the party harmed by her act is
entitled to disgorge her gain. Causality is the reason. Prior to a transaction, both the
defendant’s duty of care and the plaintiff’s right to protection are abstract, isolated and
undifferentiated. However, once the defendant begins to act, her duty attaches to and
activates the rights of those within reach of her causal force.78 These rights may take
various forms. At first, any potential victim may have a right to regulate or preempt the
threatening conduct. Since the equality and freedom of all are placed in jeopardy, each
deserves a power of self-protection. If the defendant’s causal force narrows to injure a
single person, that victim now holds a right not shared by others in the threatened class:
the right to compensation for her loss.79 Since only the defendant owed a duty to protect
the victim from this causal force, only she may repair it; and since only the plaintiff’s
interests were actually damaged by this force, only she has a right to reparation from its
creator.80
Combining these requirements, we see that a plaintiff alleging Ordinary Liability
must prove the familiar elements of duty, breach, causation and damage; and if she is
successful, may recover at least some measure of compensation from the defendant.
However, such proof does not necessarily end the determination of responsibility. It
merely shifts to the defendant the burden of offering other reason-conditions for reducing
or eliminating her liability.
Under the current paradigm, the defendant can package such reasons in the
affirmative defenses of assumption of risk, contributory negligence and comparative
fault. In the liberal justice paradigm, however, the choice of defenses is more limited. As
we have already seen, consent-based arguments like assumption of risk do not simply
shed light on the issue of reasonableness. They conclusively decide it. Thus, they cannot
be litigated as an adjunct to a theory of Ordinary Liability. Instead, they must be
addressed independently and preliminarily within the theory of Consent.
Allegations of plaintiff fault are different in two respects. First, like the
defendant’s ordinary conduct, the plaintiff’s own ordinary but potentially self-destructive
behavior cannot be prejudged, but must be measured against the standard of
reasonableness. Second, to the extent the plaintiff’s own conduct contributes to her harm,
it affects the balance of corrective justice. Thus, it is critical in assessing the overall
wrongfulness of the parties’ transaction.
Indeed, plaintiff fault is a central feature of liberal justice theory. In a state
committed to liberal justice, citizens generally do not owe to others a duty of altruism.
The corollary to this principle is that citizens generally do not have a private right to
receive assistance from their neighbors.81 This is especially true when the need for
assistance is self-imposed. As noted earlier, distributive justice—or perhaps more aptly,
redistributive justice—applies only to helpless victims of circumstance, not to those who
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control their own fate. Plaintiffs who cause or contribute to their own injuries run afoul of
this rule. They sue in the hope of compelling others to provide financial assistance for
their self-inflicted losses. This is not only impolitic, but also unjust. By acting
unreasonably, negligent plaintiffs “gain” a freedom of carelessness not enjoyed by others.
In the calculus of corrective justice, this gain must be set off against the plaintiff’s loss.
Only that part of the loss which remains becomes the defendant’s responsibility.
Everything else becomes a burden the plaintiff must bear alone.
b. The Strict Liability Matrix
These interpersonal equities change significantly when the defendant imposes
abnormal or extraordinary risks on those around her. She deviates farther from the mean
of equality than people who carelessly perform mere ordinary activities. At some level,
her deviation can create a virtual power of domination over others, who incur a
corresponding vulnerability. Thus, the extraordinary risk-creator is not governed by the
Ordinary Liability Matrix. Though still held to the standard of reasonableness, she is
subject to a separate matrix of liberal-justice Strict Liability.
The Strict Liability Matrix actually contains three subclassifications: special
actors, special activities and special relationships. This matrix partially changes the
coverage of modern strict liability theories. It also reorganizes these theories into more
meaningful categories and identifies their common basis in reasonableness. It even places
the strict liability label on a number of doctrines the current paradigm does not. Yet it
does not completely redefine the concept of strict liability. Though it expands that
definition somewhat, it mostly exposes strict liability’s current hiding places and liberates
it from its artificial theoretical shackles.
Each subclassification of liberal-justice strict liability is founded on the dual
principles of inequality and unfairness. Special actors are those who either by their very
nature or by an assumed status impose abnormal dangers on others. Adults with serious
mental disabilities currently fall into this category. Although they possess the physical
powers of average adults, they are incapable of understanding the consequences of their
actions or, in some cases, of even knowing right from wrong. Thus, in a very real sense,
they are both inherently unreasonable and abnormally dangerous people. If freed from the
requirements of reasonableness, they would enjoy a political and moral status unequal
and, in fact, superior to that of other “rational” citizens. They also would enjoy the unfair
advantage of creating and imposing dangers that others could not reciprocate. This helps
explain why courts almost uniformly have held the mentally incompetent strictly liable;
in essence, subjecting them to a standard of reasonable care that they cannot comprehend
and can never meet.82
Children engaged in adult activities receive similar treatment. Like the mentally
incompetent, children possess mental limitations which prevent them from reasoning as
ordinary adults. This incapacity, in turn, makes them unpredictable and somewhat
dangerous, both to themselves and to others. Because of a child’s small stature, limited
strength and restricted realm of social interaction, however, the dangers of her “childish”
activities are relatively less significant than those created by adults. In any event, these
dangers, whatever their degree, are a normal and necessary incident of growing up to be a
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responsible adult. Thus, children generally are only compared to other children of like
age, intelligence, maturity and experience.83
However, a child that engages in an adult activity presents especially worrisome
dangers not unlike those created by mental incompetents. Whether she operates a
motorized vehicle or hunts with a loaded rifle, the venturous child threatens more people
with far greater risks than her more reserved counterparts. This risk is only enhanced by
the child’s lack of physical strength, ignorance, immaturity and inexperience. Because
such risks are abnormal and unnecessary to a child’s development, most jurisdictions
hold children strictly liable when their adult escapades cause physical injury to others.
Here, strict liability is not openly proclaimed, but is deftly implemented through the
unreachable reasonable adult standard of care.84
Employers earn their “special” status in a different way. Their abnormality is
voluntary, not imposed. Nevertheless, their chosen status raises even greater social
concerns than children or mental incompetents. An individual is an army of one. Because
she can only be in one place at a time, she cannot invade the sovereignties of very many
people. Employers, however, are or can be the commanders-in-chief of great and
powerful armies of many. Their minions can travel almost anywhere all at once and can
camp virtually anyplace for extended periods of time. Thus, they can cut a swath of
destruction far broader and for far longer than any single soldier. As the army grows, the
employer’s capacity for mayhem, and thus her power over individuals and smaller
groups, grows with it. To control this power and neutralize this threat, the state is justified
in issuing the employer a strict admonition: you may marshal your forces and pursue your
objectives, but be prepared to answer for the casualties you inflict along the way.85
Unlike special actors, special activities are dangerous not because of who
performs them, but because of what is being done. Still, like the actors in the former
category, the activities here are both inherently and abnormally dangerous. Included in
this category are many of the same activities currently subject to strict liability: owning
wild or vicious animals, blasting, storing or transporting flammable or toxic chemicals
and so on.86 The list may vary according to custom, tradition and community tastes for
particular risks.
One “activity” currently and conspicuously left off this list is the commission of
an intentional tort. This, I believe, is a flagrant omission. Intentional torts meet all of the
material criteria for liberal-justice strict liability. In fact, they present the best case
scenario for this theory. Intentional torts are politically and morally dangerous no matter
how they are performed. Their dangers are not just abnormal, but often criminal and
presumptively unreasonable. They elevate and empower their perpetrators and debase or
at least subordinate their victims. Indeed, their potential for spreading inequality, risk and
unfairness is virtually unparalleled in all of tort Thus, they require more than mere
categorization as strict liability activities. They require their own special subcategory
within the broader strict liability matrix.87
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Statutes and other positive law enactments represent another overlooked form of
activity-based strict liability.88 Of course, not all statutes create tort duties. They earn this
status only if they express a clear legislative intent, promote a strong public policy,
establish clear behavioral requirements, resonate with existing tort duties and do not
impose disproportionate liabilities.89 Those that satisfy these criteria, however, are
especially well-suited to impose strict liability.
Like intentional torts, conduct covered by such enactments is categorically
forbidden (and unlike intentional torts, sometimes required) by a rigid rule of
responsibility. This rule carries the prejudgment of the community that such conduct is
unreasonable. Thus, any act that violates the rule is presumptively wrongful even in the
absence of other evidence. Of course, equity sometimes may find a legitimate reason to
excuse the breach. But such excuses certainly need not be either generous in number or
expansive in scope.90 The more dangerous the activity or the more imbalanced the
relationship being regulated, the more reason may limit them. Indeed, the imperatives
behind the enactment may be so great as to exclude all defenses. Although a scheme of
defenseless statutory breach is supported by liberal justice, it certainly is not unique to
that concept. Indeed, it presently is applied to many safety statutes that protect especially
vulnerable parties—like children and workers—from endangerment and exploitation.91
All of the special activities described so far create imbalances that are both
unilateral and episodic—meaning, they arise only when the actor chooses to perform
them around others. However, sometimes such imbalances can arise out of preexisting
“special” relationships. Here, the relationship itself gives one party a power of
domination and makes the other vulnerable to exploitation. The “dominant” partner
possesses knowledge and control over the risks of their association, and the “subordinate”
partner does not. Thus, the latter relies on the former for information and/or protection.
Tort law’s current paradigm recognizes many such special relationships, but treats
them inconsistently. Most special relationships are governed by the theory of negligence.
However, the dominant parties in these relationships often carry duties greater than
ordinary care.92 Indeed, some dominant partners—like common carriers and
innkeepers—bear even higher duties of extraordinary or utmost care.93 Other
relationships—like that between product sellers and consumers—have transcended the
barriers of negligence are now commonly addressed by strict liability.94
The key theoretical difference between these approaches is that, in negligence a
dominant party may escape liability by complying with the applicable standard of care,
whereas in strict liability she cannot. Nevertheless, this distinction often breaks down in
practice. In products liability actions, product sellers frequently are free to argue that their
products are not unreasonably unsafe, thus allowing them to prove indirectly that they are
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not unreasonable for placing such goods on the market.95 Plaintiffs, on the other hand,
generally cannot prevail without presenting extensive and expensive expert evidence
showing exactly how the product could have been made better.96 Even the standard of
defectiveness requires no more than that required by the standard of reasonable care: to
avoid marketing products with excessive risks.97
Ironically, the standards imposed by negligence are or can be considerably
stricter. Innkeepers can be held responsible for third-party criminal acts against their
customers;98 product sellers usually cannot.99 Common carriers owe to their customers a
duty of civility and courtesy;100 product sellers do not.101
Despite their general similarities, the three subclassifications of liberal-justice
strict liability—special actors, activities and relationships—do not necessarily warrant
identical treatment. Reasonableness distinguishes these subcategories on various grounds,
and fixes their liability rules accordingly. For example, intentional torts arise either from
a bad end—to harm others—or from bad choices—to harm others as a means to some
other end. Thus, they are subject to a pretransactional duty to refrain from such conduct.
Violation of this duty is wrongful in three different respects. It is generally unjust because
it disrespects the dignity, equality and liberty of the victim. It is particularly unjust
because it reaps for the actor an unfair gain of liberty and imposes upon the victim an
undeserved loss. And it is distributively unjust because it creates and dispenses risks of
harm far in excess of those normally permitted in a liberal democracy. To establish the
unreasonableness of the defendant’s conduct, the plaintiff need not present evidence
concerning the standard of care or its breach; she need only prove four simple facts: (1)
the defendant committed an act (2) intended to cause a forbidden consequence (3) and her
act caused (3) that forbidden consequence. Although the defendant may seek an equitable
exception from liability, the available exceptions are few in number and narrow in
scope.102
Other abnormally dangerous activities are handled differently. Owning a vicious
pet is like committing an intentional tort in one respect. Both are presumptively
irresponsible and thus subject to a pretransactional duty of care. However, unlike
intentional torts, domestic animals are not inherently dangerous. Even when they are
vicious, people generally do not keep them for the purpose of harming their neighbors.
They own them for self-directed reasons like companionship or security. Thus, the
ownership of vicious pets is not directly in violation of the natural law harm principle.
Such conduct is wrongful only if the animal’s dangerousness exceeds community norms,
and even then, only if its owner knows or should know of the animal’s abnormally
dangerous characteristic.103 Where these facts pertain, the owner not only transcends the
risk mean of distributive justice, but also unfairly gains the advantage of threatening
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those around him in a way that they themselves have forsaken. Granted, the owner may
deny his “scienter” or contest the animal’s viciousness, but equity otherwise affords him
few defenses.
Extraordinary activities like blasting deserve still different treatment. Like the
other activities, blasting creates abnormal risks. Thus, it is governed by a pretransactional
duty of responsibility. However, unlike the previous activities, blasting’s dangers, though
abnormal, are often socially acceptable or even desirable. As a result, blasting is not
wrongful per se. It may be circumstantially wrongful if it is conducted in a place where
its hazards are particularly acute. Here, fault would lie in the choice of action and
location, not in the manner of the activity’s performance.104 Even if blasting is wellperformed in an appropriate location, however, it still may produce unfair consequences
for those injured by its commission. The blaster’s grasping motive and his gain at the
expense of his neighbors create a posttransactional duty of rectification. If the blaster
breaches that duty by refusing to correct the imbalance, his response to the consequence
is particularly unjust, no matter how valuable the activity is or how reasonably he may
have conducted it.105 Thus, it is reasonable to hold him strictly liable nonetheless.
In each of these scenarios, the concept of strict liability is basically the same. The
defendant bears special or extraordinary responsibilities to control the heightened and
abnormal risks created by her conduct and to pay for the losses caused to others when she
fails to do so. Yet, as we have seen, there are many ways in which these responsibilities
can be created and implemented. Sometimes strict liability is substantive. If the theory of
Ordinary Liability establishes tort law’s substantive norm, then any deviation from that
norm makes the law stricter for one party or the other. If the changes help the plaintiff
and/or hinder the defendant, then the movement is towards liberal-justice strict liability.
Consider the range of substantive options available for this purpose. Duties can be
expanded to require protection of a greater number of people against a greater number of
risks. The transferred intent doctrine goes perhaps to the greatest extreme in this regard,
effectively stretching the intentional tortfeasor’s duty as far as the reach of his
causality.106 The standard for evaluating the defendant’s behavior can be elevated to
require extraordinary or utmost care or the care of an expert in the field.107 Or, the
standard could reflect norms within the plaintiff’s community rather than customs within
the defendant’s. The consumer expectation standard of products liability and the
reasonable patient standard of informed consent both institute this sort of perspectival
shift.108 Factual causation requirements can be altered, relaxed or replaced with concepts
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like lost chance, substantial factor, alternative liability and market share liability.109 The
notion of proximate causation can be broadened to include intervening forces, like
reckless misconduct or acts of God, that otherwise would break the chain between act and
injury.110 The definition of recoverable damages can be changed to include things like
dignitary injury, pure emotional distress, hedonic injury, pure economic loss, increased
risk or loss of a chance.111 Even defenses can be reduced in number, made more difficult
to sustain or eliminated altogether, as is true in certain negligence per se actions.112
There are a number of procedural options as well. As noted earlier, the plaintiff’s
evidentiary burden on any issue can be diminished. Thus, instead of requiring the
plaintiff to actually prove breach or causation, a court might permit the plaintiff to rely
solely on circumstantial evidence doctrines like res ipsa loquitur or the malfunction
theory of products liability.113 Alternatively, a court might control the weight of such
evidence, taking away the jury’s discretion and replacing it with a rebuttable or
conclusive presumption.114 Even more dramatically, the court could shift to the defendant
the plaintiff’s burden of proving one or more of the elements of her cause of action.115 To
compound matters further, it also could raise the defendant’s burden of persuasion on
these issues or on its own affirmative defenses, switching from a preponderance of the
evidence standard to a standard of clear and convincing evidence.116
Any system of liberal-justice strict liability will of necessity contain some
combination of these substantive and procedural mechanisms. What that combination
will be in a particular jurisdiction is largely a question of convention or preference.
However, some constraints appear endemic and inescapable. I will close by highlighting
just a few of the more salient and important ones.
Before doing so, I want to emphasize that the mechanisms described above do not
change the basic elemental structure of a tort. As previously discussed, each element is
indispensable to the morality of a tort claim. Duty defines the scope of the defendant’s
treatment or procedure, she fails to provide material information that a reasonable patient would want to
know. See DOBBS, supra note 46, at 655-56.
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distributive responsibilities. Breach of duty establishes the defendant’s wrongful gain,
and makes her vulnerable to corrective justice. Harm establishes the plaintiff’s loss and
Causation links that loss to the defendant’s wrongdoing, rendering that loss wrongful and
triggering the plaintiff’s right to corrective justice. Because affirmative defenses further
clarify the parties’ rights and responsibilities, the existence or nonexistence of such
defenses must be disclosed to the parties in advance.
Liberal-justice strict liability may be implemented by making either categorical or
episodic changes within this structure. One obvious place for categorical change is the
element of duty. Strict liability itself is categorical by nature. It applies or should apply to
all actors who are inherently unreasonable, all activities that are inherently and
abnormally dangerous and all relationships that are inherently imbalanced. Because each
subject exceeds the mean of equality, all are in need of special regulation. Because their
inequalities are intrinsic and clearly antithetical to the values of liberal justice, all can be
regulated by a specific and enhanced set of heightened duties. Thus, in addition to
carrying ordinary transactional duties, these strict liability subjects also always bear
pretransactional and/or posttransactional duties of care. Moreover, because these actors,
activities and relationships pose abnormally high risks even under normal circumstances,
they always should be subject to heightened standards of care.
Ordinarily, no categorical changes should be made to the plaintiff’s burden of
proof. As noted earlier, the requirement that the plaintiff prove the elements of her tort is
supported by both distributive and corrective justice. Because a tort suit is an assault
upon the freedoms of another, generally the party threatening this invasion, the plaintiff,
is burdened under the distributive risk criterion with the obligation of establishing
legitimate reasons for her aggression. Also, unless the plaintiff proves that the
defendant’s wrongdoing caused her harm, it is not clear either that she has a right to
corrective justice or that she may exercise that right against the defendant.
Where the defendant is accused of an intentional tort, however, the equities are
quite different. Once the plaintiff proves that the defendant acted with an invasive intent,
the act may be presumed unreasonable. At this point, the plaintiff is not the aggressor but
a presumed victim with a right of corrective justice. Because she has a special need to
protect her interests, distributive justice affords her extra freedom by lowering her
evidentiary burden. It does this by shifting to the defendant the burden of demonstrating
the reasonableness of her intentional act. Such a shift is warranted not simply by the facts
of a given case, but by the categorical wrongfulness of the alleged tort.
Other changes appear better suited to episodic application. In certain situations,
the defendant does more than injure the plaintiff; she makes it difficult for the plaintiff to
correct her loss. This might occur in at least a couple of ways. The defendant might
deliberately or inadvertently destroy evidence which explains how or why the accident
happened. Or, as in the Ybarra operating room whodunit discussed earlier, she might
withhold certain incriminating evidence. In other situations, the defendant may simply
have superior access to the information necessary to resolve the issues of responsibility
and causality. Thus, courts might be justified in lowering the causation standard, creating
presumptions of fault or causality or shifting to the defendant the burden of proving these
or other issues. Here, the defendant either places at risk the plaintiff’s ability to vindicate
her rights or enjoys an unfair advantage in that struggle. Either way, justice requires the
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defendant to relinquish her unequal status by assuming evidentiary burdens not normally
carried by litigants in other cases.
III.

CONCLUSION

Obviously, the liberal-justice paradigm of tort law that I have presented above is
far from complete. There is still plenty of work left to do. Although I have demonstrated
the plausibility of a liberal justice metatheory of torts, I have not attempted to justify its
adoption. I also have not sought to prove that it is better than other theories, either moral
or instrumental. While I have sketched out the broad contours of this new paradigm, I
have not yet delved deeply into specifics, leaving unresolved questions concerning
theories, elements, defenses, standards of analysis and burdens of proof. Indeed, I have
skipped over the Limited Liability Matrix altogether. Finally, I have not addressed the
tough cases such a paradigm is sure to create. Take medical malpractice. Doctors enjoy
relational advantages over their patients, and hold the power to expose them to serious
and abnormal risks, but they also provide an essential public service. Should they be
subject to strict liability, protected by limited liability or entirely reclassified? These and
other difficult questions still loom large.
Yet, despite its inchoate status, this liberal justice paradigm can still be
instructive. Indeed, it offers tort law a host of lessons that are both cautionary and
encouraging. On the negative side, it suggests that the modern theory of strict liability is
seriously misconceived. It is not just a substantive concept, but rather a mixture of
substance and procedure; and its substance need not be no-fault, but rather can be
grounded in the “fault” concepts of consent and reasonableness. The liberal justice
paradigm also shows that many tort theories or doctrines are misplaced. Besides treating
consent as a defense and subordinating it to other theories, the current paradigm often
excludes from strict liability some theories, like intentional torts, or some concepts, like
negligence’s mental incapacity and special relationship doctrines, that clearly should be
included within it. On a broader level, the liberal justice paradigm exposes tort law’s
inconsistency with certain core American values. But perhaps most disturbingly, it tells
us that if the modern theory of strict liability is vulnerable to attack, then the entire
theoretical structure which supports it also is in jeopardy of collapse.
On the positive side, the liberal justice paradigm reinforces the validity of much
of the law’s underlying doctrines and concepts, including the elemental structure of
negligence and intentional torts, the use of procedure as a hedge against injustice and the
very notion of strict liability. As to the latter concept, the liberal justice paradigm may
contradict strict liability’s definition and rationale, but for the most part, does not
question that concept’s application. It supports imposing strict liability in most of the
same situations, regardless of whether the theory for doing so is labeled strict liability,
negligence, intentional tort or something else. Better yet, the liberal justice paradigm
reveals that the fix for tort law’s current problems may not be as dramatic as first appears.
Granted, the law will have to undergo some theoretical relabeling and endure some
conceptual restructuring. But in the end, this seems a small price to pay for the clarity,
consistency and credibility it is likely to deliver in return.

